



GOVERNMENT OF BERMUDA
Ministry of Legal Affairs

Ministry of Legal Affairs Headquarters

**AML-ATF Ministerial Advisory 2/2024: Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing controls in higher risk jurisdictions**

Requirement to apply Enhanced Due Diligence for higher risk jurisdictions

Minister of Legal Affairs, Hon. Kathy Lynn Simmons, JP, MP today issued AML-ATF Advisory 2/2024 about the risks in a number of jurisdictions arising from inadequate systems and controls to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

The Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2008 (POCA Regulations) require the Bermuda regulated sector and relevant persons to apply enhanced customer due diligence to high-risk countries.

- Regulation 11 (1)(aa) of the Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2008, requires that a relevant person must apply on a risk-sensitive basis enhanced customer due diligence measures to business relationships with customers in instances where a person or a transaction is from or in a country that has been identified as having a higher risk by the Financial Action Task Force or the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force; and
- Regulation 11 (1)(ab) requires a relevant person to apply, on a risk-sensitive basis, enhanced customer due diligence in instances where a person or transaction is from or in a country which represents a higher risk of money laundering, corruption, terrorist financing or being subject to international sanctions.

As the international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standard-setter, FATF regularly publishes statements that identify high-risk countries based on assessments of their AML/CFT regimes. In accordance with Regulation 11 (1)(aa), the Minister for Legal Affairs would like to draw the regulated sector's and relevant persons' attention to the latest FATF publication on high risk jurisdictions.

FATF Public Statement

On 28 June 2024 FATF published two statements identifying jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes. The FATF also called on jurisdictions to be vigilant regarding potential risks to the international financial system, including growing financial connectivity of Russia with countries subject to FATF countermeasures, risks of proliferation financing, and malicious cyber activities and ransomware attacks. These statements are included at Annexes A and B.

In response to the latest FATF statements, the Minister of Legal Affairs advises the regulated sector and relevant persons to consider the following:

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| Minister of Legal Affairs Advice: | Consider as a high risk and apply counter measures and enhanced due diligence measures in accordance with the risks | Take appropriate actions to minimise the associated risks, which may include enhanced due diligence measures in high risk situations |
| Jurisdictions: | Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)* Iran* Myanmar* | Bulgaria Burkina Faso Cameroon Croatia Democratic Republic of the Congo* Haiti* Kenya Mali* Monaco Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Philippines Senegal South Africa South Sudan* Syria* Tanzania Venezuela* Vietnam Yemen* |

To ensure that an appropriate determination of the risks relating to these jurisdictions can be carried out, it is important that the annexed statements are read in their entirety. All financial institutions and relevant persons, in the implementation of their systems and controls to combat financial crime, should give consideration to the FATF assessments and take appropriate actions in light of the associated risks.

*These jurisdictions are subject to sanctions measures at the time of publication of this notice which require firms to take additional measures, in accordance with the International Sanctions Regulations 2013. Details can be found here:

<https://www.gov.bm/sites/default/files/International-Sanctions-Regulations-2013-v2.pdf>

Please see the following links for more information about international sanctions:

<https://www.gov.bm/international-sanctions-measures> and <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/financial-sanctions-regime-specific-consolidated-lists-and-releases>

Background Information

1. This Advisory replaces all previous advisory notices issued by the Minister of Legal Affairs on this subject.
2. The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body established by the G7 in 1989 and today its members include 35 member jurisdictions and two regional organisations (the European Commission and the Gulf Co-Operation Council).
3. The Bermuda Government's strategy is to use financial tools to deter crime and terrorism; detect it when it happens; and disrupt those responsible and hold them accountable for their actions. The FATF is central to Bermuda's international objectives within this strategy.
4. The Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2008 require the regulated sector and relevant persons to put in place policies and procedures in order to prevent activities related to money laundering and terrorist financing. The regulated sector and relevant persons are also required to apply enhanced customer due diligence and enhanced ongoing monitoring on a risk-sensitive basis in certain defined situations and in "any other situation, which by its nature can present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing".
5. This Advisory applies to all entities and persons subject to the POCA Regulations as provided for in Regulation 4, namely:
 - a. AML/AFT regulated financial institutions;
 - b. independent professionals;
 - c. casino operators;
 - d. dealers in high value goods, who are registered with the FIA; and
 - e. real estate brokers and real estate agents.

Therefore, these sectors shall comply with the above AML-ATF Ministerial Advisory.

6. A large number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF, thus the jurisdictions included in the FATF public statement and 'ongoing compliance' document are not intended to provide an exhaustive list of jurisdictions that should be considered by relevant persons to present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Annex A: High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action¹ - 28 June 2024

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. Since February 2020, only Iran once reported in January 2024 with no material changes in the status of its action plan.

Given heightened proliferation financing risks, the FATF reiterates its call to apply countermeasures on these high-risk jurisdictions.

Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Building upon the FATF statements over the past decade, the FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s continued failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.

The FATF has continually reiterated since 2011 the need for all countries to robustly implement the targeted financial sanctions in accordance with UNSC Resolutions and apply the following countermeasures to protect their financial systems from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing threat emanating from DPRK:

- Terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks;
- Close any subsidiaries or branches of DPRK banks in their countries; and
- Limit business relationships & financial transactions with DPRK persons.

Despite these calls, DPRK has increased connectivity with the international financial system, which raises proliferation financing (PF) risks, as the FATF noted in February 2024. This requires greater vigilance and renewed implementation and enforcement of these countermeasures against the DPRK. As set out in UNSCR 2270, DPRK frequently uses front companies, shell companies,

¹ This statement was previously called "Public Statement".

joint ventures and complex, opaque ownership structures for the purpose of violating sanctions. As such, FATF encourages its members and all countries to apply enhanced due diligence to the DPRK and its ability to facilitate transactions on its behalf.

The FATF also urges countries to adequately assess and account for the increased proliferation financing risk with the greater financial connectivity reported, particularly since the next round of assessments requires countries to adequately assess PF risks under Recommendation 1 and Immediate Outcome 11. The ability to obtain reliable and credible information to support the assessment of PF risks relating to the DPRK is hampered by the recent termination of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts mandate. Thus, the FATF will monitor the measures to comply with DPRK targeted financial sanctions and the implementation of countermeasures against DPRK.

Iran

In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran's action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not completed the action plan.

In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.

Now, given Iran's failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of countermeasures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective countermeasures, in line with Recommendation 19.

Iran will remain on the FATF statement on High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.

[1] In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran's high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan. Since 2016, Iran established a cash declaration regime, enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act and its Anti-Money Laundering Act and adopted an AML by-law.

In February 2020, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.

[2] Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks. The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction

Myanmar

In February 2020, Myanmar committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Myanmar’s action plan expired in September 2021.

In October 2022, given the continued lack of progress and the majority of its action items still not addressed after a year beyond the action plan deadline, the FATF decided that further action was necessary in line with its procedures and FATF calls on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risk arising from Myanmar. The FATF requires that as part of enhanced due diligence, financial institutions should increase the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship, in order to determine whether those transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious. When applying enhanced due diligence measures, countries should ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are not disrupted. If no further progress is made by October 2024, the FATF will consider countermeasures.

Myanmar’s overall progress continues to be slow. Myanmar should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) demonstrating that hundi operators are registered and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in law enforcement authorities (LEAs) investigations, and increasing operational analysis and

disseminations by the financial intelligence unit (FIU); (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation; and (8) addressing technical compliance deficiencies related to R.7 to ensure effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing.

The FATF urges Myanmar to work to fully address its AML/CFT deficiencies, including to demonstrate that its monitoring and supervision of money or value transfer services (MVTs) is based on documented and sound understanding of ML/TF risks to mitigate undue scrutiny of legitimate financial flows.

Myanmar will remain on the list of countries subject to a call for action until its full action plan is completed.

Annex B: Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring ² – 28 June 2024

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”.

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions. The FATF Standards do not envisage de-risking, or cutting-off entire classes of customers, but call for the application of a risk-based approach. Therefore, the FATF encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis.

The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course.

The FATF provides some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since February 2024: Bulgaria; Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Jamaica, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Türkiye, and Vietnam. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. Kenya, Namibia, Syria and Yemen chose to defer reporting; thus, the statements issued previously for those jurisdictions are included below, but it may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdictions’ AML/CFT regimes. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Monaco and Venezuela.

² This statement was previously called "Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process".

BULGARIA

Since October 2023, when Bulgaria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Bulgaria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by adopting an action plan to implement its national AML/CFT Strategy, establishing market entry controls for VASPs and postal money operators, communicating UN changes to targeted financial sanctions (TFS) and completing the implementation of a system to ensure prioritisation of STRs. Bulgaria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by:

- (1) demonstrating initial implementation of its national action plan for its AML/CFT Strategy;
- (2) addressing the remaining technical compliance deficiencies;
- (3) demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based supervision for postal money operators, currency exchange providers and real estate agents;
- (4) ensuring that the beneficial ownership information held in the Register is accurate and up-to-date;
- (5) improving investigations and prosecutions of different types of money laundering in line with risks, including high-scale corruption and organised crime;
- (6) ensuring that confiscation is pursued as a policy objective;
- (7) ensuring the ability to conduct parallel financial investigations in all terrorism investigations;
- (8) addressing gaps in the PF TFS frameworks; and
- (9) identifying the subset of non-profit organisations (NPOs) most vulnerable to TF abuse and demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based monitoring to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

BURKINA FASO

Since February 2021, when Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Burkina Faso has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by implementing a case management system for mutual legal assistance requests, developing a software for the management of STRs and establishing procedures for the implementation of the cross-border declaration system. Burkina Faso should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening resource capacities of all AML/CFT supervisory authorities and implementing risk-based supervision; (2) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; and (3) implementing an effective TFS regime related to TF and PF as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs.

The FATF notes Burkina Faso's continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have expired and work remains. The FATF urges Burkina Faso to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in December 2022.

CAMEROON

In June 2023, Cameroon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Cameroon should continue working on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) aligning AML/CFT national strategies and policies with the findings of the NRA and monitoring their implementation, and demonstrating AML/CFT cooperation and

coordination between competent authorities; (2) ensuring risk-based prioritisation of incoming international cooperation requests in line with risks and responding in an effective manner; (3) enhancing risk-based supervision of banks and implementing effective risk-based supervision for non-bank FIs and DNFBPs, and conducting appropriate outreach to high-risk FIs and DNFBPs; (4) maintaining and ensuring timely access by competent authorities to adequate and up to date beneficial ownership information on legal persons, and establishing a sanctions regime for violations of transparency obligations applicable to legal persons; (5) enhancing secure information exchange between the FIU, reporting entities and competent authorities and demonstrating an increase in dissemination of intelligence reports to support operational needs of competent authorities; (6) demonstrating that authorities are able to conduct a range of ML investigations, and prosecute ML in line with risks; (7) implementing policies and procedures for seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and managing frozen, seized and confiscated property, and prioritising seizure and confiscation of assets at the border; (8) demonstrating that TF investigations and prosecutions are pursued in line with risk; and (9) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF TFS regimes and implementing a risk-based approach to NPOs without disrupting legitimate NPO activities.

CROATIA

Since June 2023, when Croatia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Croatia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including demonstrating the ability to systematically detect and where relevant investigate TF in line with its risk profile, addressing technical compliances deficiencies in

relation to Recommendations 6 and 7, providing guidance to reporting entities on TFS, and identifying the subset of NPOs most vulnerable to TF abuse. Croatia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) increasing FIU human resources and improving analytical capabilities; (2) continuing to improve law enforcement authorities' (LEAs') detection, investigation and prosecution of different types of ML, including ML involving a foreign predicate offences and the misuse of legal persons; (3) demonstrating a sustained increase in the application of provisional measures in securing direct/indirect proceeds, as well as foreign proceeds subject to confiscation; (4) demonstrating immediate communication of changes in UN TFS regimes to reporting entities and (5) providing targeted outreach to NPOs and to the donor community on potential vulnerabilities of NPOs to TF abuse.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Since October 2022, when the DRC made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the DRC has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by disseminating the results of their NRA and providing financial and human resources to FI and DNFBP supervisors. The DRC should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (2) building the capacity of the FIU to conduct operational and strategic analysis; (3) strengthening the capabilities of authorities involved in the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; and (4) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF-related TFS.

HAITI

Since June 2021, when Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Haiti has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including improving the FIU's access to and use of a wide range of information in its financial intelligence products through the adoption of a new organic law. The FATF recognises the political commitment expressed at a high level and the efforts demonstrated by Haiti to advance its commitments in the midst of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Haiti should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (3) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (4) ensuring the FIU has adequate resources and processes to produce and disseminate operational and strategic analysis to competent authorities for combatting ML and TF; (4) demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti's risk profile; (5) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crimes; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime; and (7) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

The FATF notes Haiti's continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines are expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Haiti to continue to implement its

action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies.

KENYA

(Statement from February 2024)

In February 2024, Kenya made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in September 2022, Kenya has made progress on some of the MER's recommended actions including by making amendments to its AML/CFT legislation to bring its framework in closer compliance with the FATF recommendations and establishing a case management system to better manage its international cooperation requests. Kenya will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) completing a TF risk assessment and presenting the results of the NRA and other risk assessments in a consistent manner to competent authorities and the private sector and updating the national AML/CFT strategies; (2) improving risk-based AML/CFT supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and adopting a legal framework for the licensing and supervision of VASPs; (3) enhancing the understanding of preventive measures by FIs and DNFBPs, including to increase STR filing and implement TFS without delay; (4) designating an authority for the regulation of trusts and collection of accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information and implementing remedial actions for breaches of compliance with transparency requirements for legal persons and arrangements; (5) improving the use and quality of financial intelligence products; (6) increasing ML and TF investigations and prosecutions in line with risks; (7) bringing the TFS framework in compliance with R.6 and R.7 and ensure its effective implementation; and (8) revising the framework for NPO regulation and oversight to ensure that mitigating measures are risk-based

and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity.

MALI

Since October 2021, when Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mali has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing a framework for the monitoring of NPOs at risk of abuse for TF purposes and implementing measures commensurate with the risk. Mali should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating timely access to accurate beneficial ownership information; (2) addressing pending technical compliance deficiencies with R.5 and 20, and identifying and investigating TF activities in line with the country's risk profile; and (3) implementing TFS related to TF and PF.

The FATF notes Mali's continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Mali to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible.

MONACO

In June 2024, Monaco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report (MER) in December 2022, Monaco has made significant progress on several of the MER's recommended actions including by establishing a new combined financial intelligence unit (FIU) and AML/CFT supervisor, strengthening its approach to detecting and investigating terrorism financing, implementing targeted financial sanctions and risk-based supervision of non-profit organisations. Monaco will continue to work

with FATF to implement its action plan by: (1) strengthening the understanding of risk in relation to money laundering and income tax fraud committed abroad; (2) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound requests to identify and seek the seizure of criminal assets abroad (3) enhancing the application of sanctions for AML/CFT breaches and breaches of basic and beneficial ownership requirements; (4) completing its resourcing program for its FIU and strengthen the quality and timeliness of STR reporting; (5) enhancing judicial efficiency, including through increasing resources of investigative judges and prosecutors and the application of effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for money laundering; and (6) increasing the seizure of property suspected to derive from criminal activities.

MOZAMBIQUE

Since October 2022, when Mozambique made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mozambique has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by commencing the collection of beneficial ownership information, developing a CFT strategy and enhancing the capacity of CFT investigative and prosecutorial authorities, and addressing deficiencies in the TFS framework. Mozambique should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) providing adequate financial and human resources to supervisors, developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (2) increasing the human resources of the FIU as well as increasing financial intelligence sent to authorities; (3) demonstrating LEAs' capability to effectively investigate a range of ML offences using financial intelligence; (4) conducting training for FIU, supervisors, and LEAs on the new legal and institutional framework for

implementing TFS; and (6) carrying out the TF risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan.

NAMIBIA

(Statement from February 2024)

In February 2024, Namibia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in September 2022, Namibia has made progress on its MER's recommended actions to ensure a common understanding of ML/TF/PF risk across key stakeholders as well as improve international cooperation. Namibia will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) strengthening its AML/CFT risk based supervision through enhancing the human and resource capacities, conducting offsite and onsite inspections informed by supervisory risk assessment tools and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (2) enhancing preventive measures through inspections and outreach to ensure that FIs and DNFBPs apply enhanced due diligence measures as well as TFS obligations related to TF and PF without delay; (3) increasing the filing of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements, and applying remedial actions and/or effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against breaches of compliance with beneficial ownership obligations; (4) providing the FIU with adequate human and financial resources, as well as trainings, to improve operational and strategic analysis; (5) improving the cooperation between the FIU and LEAs to enhance the use and integration of financial intelligence in investigations; (6) enhancing the operational capabilities of authorities involved in ML and TF investigations and prosecutions by providing

them with adequate resources and targeted trainings; (7) demonstrating the LEAs' capabilities to effectively investigate and prosecute ML/TF cases; and (8) approving the amended National Counter Terrorism Strategy.

NIGERIA

Since February 2023, when Nigeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Nigeria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by completing its residual ML/TF risk assessments and disseminating the results, and increasing the dissemination of financial intelligence by the FIU and its use by LEA in line with the country's risk profile. Nigeria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) enhancing formal and informal international cooperation in line with ML/TF risks; (2) improving AML/CFT risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and enhancing implementation of preventive measures for high-risk sectors; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information on legal persons and applying sanctions for breaches of obligations; (5) demonstrating a sustained increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with ML risks; (6) proactively detecting violations of currency declaration obligations and apply appropriate sanctions; (7) demonstrating sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of different types of TF activities in line with risk and enhancing interagency cooperation on TF investigations; and (8) implementing risk-based monitoring for the subset of NPOs at risk of TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

PHILIPPINES

Since June 2021, when the Philippines made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the Philippines has taken significant steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; enforcement of beneficial ownership transparency obligations and law enforcement access to those beneficial ownership data records; and that risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring. The Philippines should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (2) applying cross-border measures to all main sea/airports including detection of false declarations of currency and confiscation action in line with risk; and (3) demonstrating an increase in the prosecution of TF cases in line with risk.

The FATF urges the Philippines to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in January 2023.

SENEGAL

In February 2021, Senegal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its June 2024 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Senegal has substantially completed its action plan and warrant an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

Senegal has made the following key reforms including: (1) demonstrating consistent understanding of ML/TF risks across relevant

authorities; (2) seeking international cooperation to facilitate ML/TF investigations and tracing of proceeds of crime located abroad, (3) demonstrating that FIs and DNFBPs are subject to adequate and effective risk-based supervision and sanction measures and that they improve compliance with AML/CFT obligations including by increasing STR reporting and establishing effective internal control mechanisms, (4) maintaining adequate, accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information and ensuring its timely access by competent authorities, (5) increasing the capacity of the FIU staff to conduct analysis and increasing the dissemination of financial intelligence, (6) increasing the capacity of law enforcement authorities in the detection and investigation of ML and predicate offences in line with risk and maintaining statistics on cases investigated and prosecuted, (7) establishing policies and procedures for the identification and seizure of proceeds of crime and demonstrating the effective application of seizing and freezing powers of relevant competent authorities, (8) strengthening the law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities' understanding of TF risks and CFT capacity and demonstrating that TF investigations are in line with Senegal's risk profile, (9) implementing targeted financial sanction regime, and (10) implementing a risk-based monitoring regime for NPOs at risk of abuse for TF purposes.

SOUTH AFRICA

Since February 2023, when South Africa made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Africa has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime including by implementing and updating its supervisory risk assessment tools for DNFBPs, updating its TF risk

assessment, and enhancing the capacity of relevant CFT authorities. South Africa should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests that help facilitate ML/TF investigations and confiscations of different types of assets in line with its risk profile; (2) demonstrating that all AML/CFT supervisors apply effective, proportionate, and effective sanctions for non-compliance; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date BO information on legal persons and arrangements and applying sanctions for breaches of violation by legal persons to beneficial ownership obligations; (5) demonstrate a sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of serious and complex money laundering and the full range of TF activities in line with its risk profile; (6) enhancing its identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of a wider range of predicate crimes, in line with its risk profile; (7) ensuring the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions and demonstrating an effective mechanism to identify individuals and entities that meet the criteria for domestic designation.

SOUTH SUDAN

Since June 2021, when South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Sudan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by becoming a party to the relevant UN Conventions. South Sudan should continue to work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) completing its comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012), with the support of international partners, including technical assistance, to comply with

the FATF Standards; (2) fully implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (3) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (4) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (5) operationalising a fully functioning and independent FIU; (6) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (7) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse.

The FATF notes South Sudan's limited progress across its action plan with all deadlines now expired and work remaining. The FATF again encourages South Sudan to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible and demonstrate strong political and institutional commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, particularly in supporting the lead AML/CFT agency in coordinating national AML/CFT efforts.

SYRIA

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and

establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

TANZANIA

Since October 2022, when Tanzania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Tanzania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by finalising the risk-based supervision manuals for the real estate and DPMS sectors, demonstrating progress in the LEAs' capacity to identify, trace, seize and, where feasible, confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, producing written guidance and trainings to enhance the private sector's understanding of TF and PF TFS obligations, completing the revision of the national TF risk assessment and categorising the NPOs considered at high risk of TF abuse. Tanzania should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving the risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, including by conducting inspections on a risk-sensitive basis and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (2) demonstrating authorities' capability (including through improving the use of financial intelligence and availability of statistics) to effectively conduct a range of investigations and prosecutions of ML in line with the country's risk profile; (3) developing and beginning to implement a comprehensive national CFT strategy as well as demonstrating a

capability to conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions in line with the country's risk profile; and (4) using the recently completed TF risk assessment for NPOs as a basis to develop an outreach and training plan.

VENEZUELA

In June 2024, Venezuela made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in November 2022, Venezuela has made progress on some of the MER's recommended actions including by updating its national risk assessment. Venezuela will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) strengthening its understanding of ML/TF risks, including in relation to TF and legal persons and arrangements; (2) ensuring the full range of financial institutions and DNFBPs are subject to AML/CFT measures and risk-based supervision; (3) ensuring adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is accessible in a timely manner; (4) enhancing the resources of the FIU and improving competent authorities' use of financial intelligence; (5) enhancing the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; (6) ensuring measures to prevent the abuse of NPOs for TF are targeted, proportionate, and risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate activities within the NPO sector; and (7) implementing TF-and PF-related targeted financial sanctions without delay.

VIETNAM

Since June 2023, when Vietnam made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Vietnam has made limited progress. The FATF strongly encourages Vietnam to coordinate internally to demonstrate further progress on its action plan and share relevant information with the FATF. Vietnam should continue to work on implementing its

action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) increasing risk understanding, domestic co-ordination and co-operation to combat ML/TF; (2) enhancing international co-operation; (3) implementing effective risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; (4) taking action to regulate virtual assets and virtual asset service providers; (5) addressing technical compliance deficiencies, including with respect to the ML offence, targeted financial sanctions, customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting; (6) conducting outreach activities with the private sector; (7) establishing a regime that provides competent authorities with adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership; (8) ensuring the independence of the FIU and enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and disseminations; (9) prioritizing parallel financial investigations and demonstrating an increase in the number of ML investigations and prosecutions undertaken; and (10) demonstrating that there is monitoring of FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with PF TFS obligations and that there is co-operation and co-ordination between authorities to prevent PF TFS from being evaded.

YEMEN

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious

transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Jurisdictions No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF

JAMAICA

The FATF welcomes Jamaica's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Jamaica strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2020 by, (1) developing a more comprehensive understanding of its ML/TF risk; (2) including all FIs and DNFBPs in the AML/CFT regime and implementing adequate risk based supervision in all sectors; (3) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (4) taking proper measures to increase ML investigations and prosecutions, in line with the country's risk profile, and increasing the use of financial intelligence in ML investigations; (5) implementing targeted financial sanctions for terrorist financing without delay; and (6) implementing a risk based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes. Jamaica is therefore no longer subject to the FATF's increased monitoring process.

Jamaica should continue to work with CFATF to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.

TÜRKIYE

The FATF welcomes Türkiye's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Türkiye strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in October 2021 including by (1) dedicating more resources at the FIU to supervision of AML/CFT compliance by high-risk sectors and increasing on-site inspections overall; (2) applying dissuasive sanctions for AML/CFT breaches, in particular for unregistered money transfer services and exchange offices and in relation to the requirements of adequate, accurate, and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; (3) enhancing the use of financial intelligence to support ML investigations and increasing proactive disseminations by the FIU; (4) undertaking more complex money laundering investigations and prosecutions; (5) setting out clear responsibilities and measurable performance objectives and metrics for the authorities responsible for recovering criminal assets and pursuing

terrorism financing cases and using statistics to update risk assessments and inform policy; (6) conducting more financial investigations in terrorism cases, prioritising TF investigations and prosecutions related to UN-designated groups and ensuring TF investigations are extended to identify financing and support networks; (7) concerning targeted financial sanctions under UNSCRs 1373 and 1267, pursuing outgoing requests and domestic designations related to UN-designated groups, in line with Turkey's risk profile; (8) implementing a risk-based approach to oversight of non-profit organisations to prevent their abuse for terrorist financing, conducting outreach to a broad range of NPOs in the sector and engaging with their feedback, ensuring that sanctions applied are proportionate to any violations, and taking steps to ensure that supervision does not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity, such as fundraising. Türkiye is therefore no longer subject to the FATF's increased monitoring process.

Türkiye should continue to work with the FATF to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system, including by continuing to ensure its oversight of the NPO sector is risk-based and in line with the FATF standards.